Cracking Down on Corruption | Opinion | The Moscow Times

The FCPA prohibits offering, giving or authorizing anything of value — whether cash or other tangible property or intangibles such as personal favors — to any non-U.S. official, including individuals serving state-controlled commercial enterprises, political party or political candidate to obtain some business advantage. The statute also requires companies to keep accurate books and maintain internal controls designed to prevent or detect improper payments.

Why is this relevant? First, non-U.S. companies are also subject to the FCPA if they conduct business in the United States, if their shares are listed on U.S. exchanges, or if they act on behalf of a U.S. company in connection with an illicit payment to a foreign public official.

Mercedes-Benz’s affiliate in Russia recently became the first Russian-based company to face criminal charges under the FCPA. It pleaded guilty in a Washington courtroom on April 2, agreeing to pay more than $27 million in criminal fines to settle charges arising out of bribes paid to Russian officials or relatives of Russian officials, in many cases through shell companies registered in the United States and into or through bank accounts located in the United States.

Second, Russian companies seeking to do business with U.S. partners and others subject to the FCPA must not present compliance risks that outweigh the potential benefits of cooperation. Faced with evidence that a partner is paying or considering bribes in connection with its business, the U.S. company must undertake an internal investigation that can take years to complete and cost tens of millions of dollars. Criminal and civil fines and remediation can add millions more. Given these risks to their reputation and to their bottom line, companies are increasingly saying “no” if they even suspect that a partner may subject them to risks of FCPA liability.

How can Russian companies make sure that they are saying “yes” instead of “no”? First, they must deal with potential compliance problems as quickly as possible and resolve any issues before their prospective partners begin performing due diligence. Second, it is important that companies institute strict and enforceable internal policies to regulate the use of cash, payments to charitable and political organizations at the request of public officials and the questionable use of intermediary companies.

All companies doing business in Russia should  make a commitment to integrity and transparency. This means that if they make or made illicit payments or provided other benefits to any public officials, these practices must stop and remedial methods must be taken as soon as possible.

Russian companies must be committed to the elimination of illicit payments, and the institution of internal controls should be embodied in a comprehensive anti-corruption compliance program. This must be supported by leadership and updated as the company’s business and anti-corruption rules evolve. Employees must believe that there will be real rewards for compliance in terms of compensation and advancement, and there must be real consequences for failure to comply.

Russian companies must ensure that third parties with which it does business are legitimate companies, capable of performing the services for which they were contracted, and not merely conduits for improper payments. To the extent that a third party is connected to a government official, it should be confident that he will not misuse his position for the company’s benefit.

via Cracking Down on Corruption | Opinion | The Moscow Times.

Dragging one’s feet on e-discovery: Walking on a thin line | Ledjit

In Canreal Management and Corp. v. Mercedes-Benz Canada Inc., the main question was about the existence of a contract between the defendant and the plaintiff, a real estate services company. Were there to be a contract, the defendant would owe the plaintiff a commission of nearly half a million dollars on its real estate transaction with a third party.

This decision is on a plaintiff’s motion for an order to strike out the defendant’s appearance or, alternatively, its statement of defense. The net result would be akin to a default judgment for the plaintiff. The plaintiff alleges that the defendant showed deliberately obstrusive and grossly negligent and failed to search of withheld documents. In his response, the defendant alleges, on the basis of a representative affidavit, that its research is still going on with its IT department best efforts, yielding new results that are forwarded to the plaintiff. Meanwhile, the plaintiff examined a former employee of the defendant who gave indications in contradiction with the defendant’s representative’s affidavit .

Although the Court is of the opinion that “the material before [it] does not support the plaintiff’s suggestion that the defendant has been guilty of deliberate misconduct or that it has attempted to conceal relevant documents”, it finds “that the defendant’s efforts to identify and produce relevant documents have been neither as thorough nor as timely as required, given the nature and circumstances of this case”[¶24].

The Court also note that:

“the defendant has not provided sufficient explanation for the dilatory and piecemeal document production that has taken place in the face of repeated demands. At the very least, the most recent document production calls into question the thoroughness of the searches previously deposed to and requires some explanation of how these documents could have been missed, as well as some assurance that whatever was defective in those previous searches has now been rectified.”

via Dragging one’s feet on e-discovery: Walking on a thin line.